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Previous research has found that CSR initiatives can preserve firm-value after an 
adverse event, or that CSR has “insurance-like” properties. Catastrophic events, 
however, can increase scrutiny and pressure upon an entire industry. To improve 
the industry’s damaged reputation and lessen external pressure, some members of 
the industry will often engage in self-regulation. I posit that firms with substantive 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives will actually lose more firm-value 
after a catastrophe, because they will be expected to engage in costly self-regulation 
after the event. I also argue that due to strategic activist targeting, firms subject to 
greater past activism will lose more firm-value. Using an event-study, I examine 
the apparel industry after the collapse of Rana Plaza.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s performance can be heavily influenced by its reputation. Because audiences 
increasingly consider a firm’s social responsibility when assessing the firm’s overall reputation 
(Bermiss, Zajac, and King, 2013), many have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives. Past research has shown that CSR initiatives have “insurance-like,” or risk 
management properties, that protect the firm’s reputation and temper stakeholder reactions after 
an adverse event (Flammer, 2013; Fombrun, 2005; Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett, 2000; 
Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Kim and Lyon, 2011; Minor and Morgan, 
2011). For example, after a product recall, a firm with a strict safety standards in place can signal 
to stakeholders that the firm has already taken steps to prevent such an event from occurring. 
This program allows the firm to signal that the event was more likely an aberration, rather than 
indicative of a systematic problem, causing stakeholders to give the firm “the benefit of the 
doubt” (Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009). Thus, having implemented CSR initiatives can, 
under certain conditions, preserve firm-value after an adverse event.  
Unfortunately, reputations can be difficult to manage, because the actions of other firms 
in an industry can shape a firm’s reputation for the better or for the worse (Barnett and Hoffman, 
2008; Hill and Schneeweis, 1983; Rees, 1994). Catastrophes such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
and the Union Carbide gas leak can shift stakeholder perceptions of an entire industry, not just 
for those firms that are responsible for the accident (Hoffman, 2001). Thus, firms within an 
industry share a “reputation commons” (Barnett, 2006; Fauchart and Cowan, 2014; King, Lenox, 
and Barnett, 2002). Catastrophic events create a reputation commons problem for industries 
because they increase public discontent with the industry overall, thereby increasing the risk of 
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boycotts, social movement pressures, and even lobbying for regulations (Barnett and King, 2008; 
Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; Rees, 1997).  
To temper stakeholder reactions to an industry-wide catastrophe, a subset of firms may 
individually decide to self-regulate and voluntarily make costly improvements to their social 
performance (Barnett and King, 2008). However, some firms will decide to free-ride, or benefit 
from the industry’s improved reputation that results from the self-regulatory actions made by 
others, without making any improvements themselves (Dawson and Seegerson, 2008; King and 
Lenox, 2000). Thus, a catastrophe that prompts industry self-regulation may destroy more firm-
value for those expected to self-regulate to account for the cost of the future investments. I posit 
that firms with existing CSR initiatives are subject to greater expectations to be the self-
regulators within the industry and will therefore lose more firm-value. If this is the case, then 
CSR might not always act as a risk management tool when the event is catastrophic enough to 
prompt industry self-regulation.  
Beyond this, I explore several other factors that might influence the financial markets’ 
response after an industry-wide catastrophe. I posit that firms subject to greater activism from 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), will also be subject to greater pressure to self-regulate 
after the catastrophe. Finally, I argue firms can lessen the negative response from the markets 
when they are capable of distinguishing themselves from the industry as “good” CSR 
performers. By advertising their superior performance, firms with CSR may separate themselves 
from the negative perception of the industry (King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002).  
This study examines the market response to the apparel industry after the collapse of 
Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, which killed more than 1,100 employees. Worldwide attention to the 
collapse increased support for activists’ demands for better safety standards in textile 
4 
 
manufacturing. The collapse was followed by a strong increase in pressure on the industry to 
self-regulate, but little to no threat of regulation from public officials. Thus, this setting allows 
me to isolate the effect of an increase in pressure for industry self-regulation on firm-value.  
The results of the event study reveal that the markets responded more negatively to 
apparel firms with substantive CSR initiatives (i.e., they regularly audit their suppliers to ensure 
that they are complying with social standards, such as health and safety requirements). I also find 
that the markets responded more negatively to firms that are under greater pressure from 
activists. Finally, I find that the negative effect of having substantive CSR initiatives is mitigated 
when firms are better able to distinguish themselves as “good” CSR performers. This study 
contributes to the literature by exploring whether CSR initiatives might actually destroy firm-
value after an industry-wide catastrophe that prompts the need for industry self-regulation by 
drawing on both reputation commons and social movement theories.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In the following section, I draw upon theories on the reputation commons problem, the value of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), and social movements to develop my hypotheses on the 
factors that drive the impact of an industry-wide catastrophe on firm-value.  
Reputation commons problem  
A major catastrophe within an industry can shift the way the public, regulators, and investors 
perceive the entire industry, not just the firm at fault (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; Meyer, 1982; 
Yu, Sengul, and Lester, 2008). For example, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill an oil executive was 
quoted as saying “We were doing fine until Exxon spilled all that oil. Then we were painted by 
the same brush as them” (as quoted in Hoffman, 2001).  
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This interdependence of reputations within an industry has been referred to as a 
“reputation commons” (Barnett, 2006, Barnett and King, 2008, King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002). 
This literature theorizes that because stakeholders often cannot distinguish between the good 
performers and the poor performers within an industry, all firms within an industry will benefit 
from the actions of the good performers and suffer from the actions of the poor performers. For 
example, a gas leak at a Union Carbide facility in Bhopal, India, which killed more than 3,000 
people, damaged the value of all firms within the chemical industry (Blacconiere and Patten, 
1994). In the wake of Union Carbide, a survey collected by the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association found that the majority of the public believed that “The chemical industry has no 
self-control” and that the industry “does not put safety and the environment first.” As Rees 
(1997) notes, such lack of support from the public can lead to increased rates of boycotts, 
protests, and eventually public policy changes.  
One strategy firms can use to mitigate the reputation commons problem is to self-regulate 
(King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002). Firms decide individually how much to self-regulate and those 
improvements collectively improve the industry’s aggregate reputation. Such actions can lessen 
pressure from regulators (Dawson and Segerson, 2008; Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000) and 
improve the industry’s reputation with the public (Barnett and King, 2008), thereby diffusing the 
negative response to the catastrophe. Indeed, evidence suggests that firms within an industry do 
respond to the reputation commons problem created by a catastrophe by self-regulating. Patten 
(1992) found that after the Exxon Valdez oil spill there was a significant increase in 
environmental disclosures by the entire oil industry, not just Exxon. Furthermore, after the Union 
Carbide catastrophe the chemical industry created Responsible Care, a voluntary self-regulatory 
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institution. Participants of Responsible Care pledged to go above and beyond environmental 
regulatory requirements to help prevent future accidents.  
Industry self-regulation, however, is a collective action problem and is therefore subject 
to free-riding (King and Lenox, 2000). Free riders make no improvements of their own, but still 
benefit from improvements of the self-regulators, which improve the industry’s collective 
reputation. Dawson and Segerson (2008) model a situation in which an industry is threatened 
with regulation if it fails to improve its aggregate environmental performance. They find that 
only a subset of firms will make the investments needed to mitigate the threat. The proactive, in 
essence, subsidize the free riders to ensure that the collective performance of the industry has 
improved enough to mitigate the threat of regulation. Furthermore, a case study examining the 
European chlorine industry found that firms with strong safety programs engaged in costly 
efforts to help the poor performers improve their safety programs to diminish pressure from 
Greenpeace’s “chlorine-free” campaign (Fauchart and Cowan, 2014). Thus, when confronted 
with regulatory or activist pressure (often brought upon by catastrophes), a subset of firms will 
respond strategically by self-regulating, while others will free ride. In anticipation of these 
expenses, the financial markets will react more negatively to the members of the industry they 
suspect will self-regulate.  
I posit that firms with existing substantive CSR initiatives will be expected to make 
future improvements to their operations after a catastrophe. Substantive CSR initiatives have 
been defined as requiring the continued commitment of the firm to meet specific social or 
environmental goals, which often requires costly investments (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 
2010). Firms with substantive CSR at the time of the catastrophe will be subject to greater 
expectations from their stakeholders to self-regulate, because they have built a reputation as 
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being a “CSR leader.” Thus, they risk eliciting stronger negative reactions if they fail to react 
proactively (Dean, 2004).  
Previous research has found that CSR initiatives can provide “insurance-like,” or risk 
management, protection after an adverse event (Flammer, 2013; Fombrun, Gardberg, Barnett, 
2000; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Minor and Morgan, 2011). CSR initiatives cause 
stakeholder to give the firm “the benefit of the doubt,” because it signals to external stakeholders 
that the firm is behaving in a socially responsible manner in line with stakeholder expectations 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Husted, 2000), which consequently generates goodwill (Godfrey, 
2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009). However, I argue that after a catastrophe, which is 
often followed by social movements demanding industry-wide improvements or changes, CSR 
initiatives signal that the firm will make the necessary adjustments to improve and remain in line 
with stakeholder’s updated expectations. Thus, CSR might not provide risk management after a 
catastrophic event that shifts stakeholder perceptions.  
As such, I argue that financial markets will react more negatively to firms with 
substantive CSR initiatives. Financial markets will anticipate that firms with a history of 
investing in CSR activities will be subject to greater pressures from stakeholders to make costly 
changes needed to lessen pressure from the public. Therefore, I propose the following:  
H1: After a catastrophe, the decline in shareholder value is larger for firms with 
substantive CSR initiatives.  
Ability to differentiate 
An additional way to attempt to mitigate the reputation commons problem is for firms to 
differentiate themselves (King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002). After a catastrophe, firms can 
advertise or provide information to their end-customers to inform them of their superior social or 
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environmental performance. Being able to credibly advertise superior performance might not 
entirely protect a firm from the negative effects of increased scrutiny or negative public opinion 
of the industry overall, but it might help insulate the firm’s individual reputation.  
Furthermore, customers increasingly value products that are manufactured in a socially 
responsible or environmentally friendly manner. A firm’s social performance has been found to 
influence customers’ willingness to pay a price premium for products (Roe, Levy, and Russell, 
2001) and it influences customer perceptions of the quality of the firm’s products (Sen and 
Bhattacharya, 2001). Catastrophes draw the public’s attention to social and environmental issues 
inherent in the industry, which can increase demand for socially responsible or “green” products. 
For example, in Europe after horsemeat was discovered in food labeled as “all beef,” demand 
increased for local butchers, who could credibly claim that their meat was 100 percent beef. 
However, demand for frozen burgers at supermarkets declined 41 percent after the discovery 
(Morris, 2014). As such, financial markets might react less negatively to firms with superior 
social and environmental performances after a catastrophe as they can better distinguish 
themselves for two reasons: 1) these firms can partially protect their reputations, and 2) the 
catastrophe may lead to an increase in demand for their products.  
Unfortunately, there is a great deal of stakeholder confusion regarding the meaning and 
value of CSR claims (see King, Prado, and Rivera, 2010). Many of the CSR claims made are 
merely symbolic. Symbolic CSR initiatives are simply empty promises to behaving responsibly, 
while failing to make the necessary investments needed to ensure those commitments are met. 
Given that customers might unwittingly reward firms with symbolic initiatives, CSR initiatives, 
regardless of their quality, might help preserve firm-value after a catastrophe amongst firms that 
can more easily distinguish themselves from the industry. Therefore, I propose the following: 
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H2: After a catastrophe, the decline in shareholder value is less negative for firms with 
CSR initiatives (regardless of quality) when they can distinguish themselves.  
Unequal sanctions from activists 
Catastrophes are often followed by public discontent and distrust with the industry overall (Rees, 
1997). In their discussion of the reputation commons problem, Barnett and King (2008: pg. 
1152) posit that all firms within the industry are subject to an increase in the probability of 
attacks from activists. This could be in the form of an increase in the number of (or the 
readership of) industry-wide reports from activist groups detailing social or environmental risks 
typical to the industry. For example, during their “Detox Fashion” campaign, Greenpeace 
released a series of reports on the apparel industry’s use of hazardous chemicals and dyes. These 
reports name dozens of “guilty” companies in the apparel industry, but they also illuminate 
systematic environmental risks associated with the industry at large.1 However, while each firm 
in the industry might realize some increase in scrutiny from activists after a catastrophe, I posit a 
subset of firms will be impacted more severely.  
Not all firms are targeted equally. In fact, work on social movements has shown that 
activist groups are highly strategic when deciding which firms to target and criticize (Briscoe, 
Chin, and Hambrick, 2014; Lenox and Eesley, 2009; Soule, 2009; Zhang and Luo, 2014). Baron 
and Diermeier (2007) theorize that because activist groups have limited resources, they will 
focus their attention on “soft targets,” or firms that they believe will be easier to pressure into 
conceding to their demands. Work on social movements has explored how activist groups 
influence firm practices by using targeted “name and shame” campaigns, boycotts, divestment 
                                                     
1 A list of the industry reports regarding their Detox campaign can be found on Greenpeace’s website here: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/toxics/water/detox/. Last accessed December, 2014.  
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campaigns, and even lawsuits (Durand and Vergne, 2014; Eesley and Lenox, 2006; McDonnell 
and King, 2013; King, 2008). Such tactics not only create direct costs to the firm by interrupting 
operations, but also indirect costs by damaging the firm’s reputation (Bartley and Child, 2011; 
Ingram, Yue, and Rao, 2010; King, 2011; Schurman, 2004).  
To pressure the firm into making concessions, activists use such “contentious 
performances” to gain the attention and support of sympathetic stakeholders such as customers, 
potential employees, and investors (King and Pearce, 2010; Tilly, 2008). Activist groups use 
channels such as the media to promote and spread information on the firm’s activities that the 
activist group wishes to change (King, 2008; King, 2011). Empirical evidence suggests that 
without support of the media activist pressure alone is unsuccessful (Campa, 2014). Because 
catastrophic events prompt increased media attention and the public’s sympathy to the issues 
evoked by the catastrophe, existing activist campaigns can gain momentum. Moreover, the 
increased interest in the issues at hand can prompt new campaigns. Therefore, firms subjected to 
greater past activist pressure will be impacted more negatively by a catastrophe for two reasons: 
1) the impact of existing campaigns will increase, and 2) because activists are highly strategic, 
firms targeted in the past are more likely to be targeted again in the future, because they have 
been previously identified as “soft” targets. 
H3: After a catastrophe, the decline in shareholder value is larger for firms that are 
subject to greater activist pressure. 
THE COLLAPSE OF RANA PLAZA 
On April 24th, 2013 in Dhaka, Bangladesh an eight-story building housing five textile 
manufacturers collapsed killing 1,127 employees and injuring 2,500 more. The building had 
been constructed without official permits and failed to meet basic building codes. It was also 
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revealed that factory managers had threatened to fire employees that refused to return to work 
despite employee concerns that the building was shaking and large cracks had formed overnight.  
Twenty three apparel brands were eventually linked to Rana Plaza, either because they 
were sourcing from those factories directly or because their suppliers were sub-contracting to 
them (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2014). It took activists weeks to uncover the connections and 
even longer for the accused to confirm and admit that they had been connected to the factory. In 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse it remained largely unclear which brands were connected 
to Rana Plaza directly. However, images of the collapse were on the front page of newspapers 
worldwide.  
In addition to spurring new reports from activist groups on the industry’s labor 
conditions, including: “Fact Sheet: Unsafe Garment Factory Buildings,” and “Never Again: 
Making Fashion’s Factories Safe,” 2 the collapse also led to activists targeting specific 
companies. Protestors demonstrated outside of Primark’s headquarters after it was discovered 
that Primark suppliers had subcontracted to factories in Rana Plaza. The activist group Avaaz 
also created an ad pairing a photo of the CEO of Hennes and Mauritz (H&M) next to a photo of a 
victim of the collapse with the caption “Karl-Johan, enough fashion victims?” This was despite 
H&M never being linked to Rana Plaza. Furthermore, The Gap, also never linked to Rana Plaza, 
was awarded the “Public Eye” award for the worst company of the year for “refus[ing] to 
contribute to effective reforms in the textile industry” after the collapse (War on Want, 2014).  
Following the collapse, two activist groups, the CCC and the Workers’ Rights 
Consortium, created the “Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,” a voluntary self-
                                                     
2 The Clean Clothes Campaign report “Still Waiting” can be found here: 
http://www.cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/still-waiting/view. The SOMO report “Fact Sheet” can be found 
here: http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3979/?searchterm=rana. Last accessed December, 2014.  
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regulatory institution. Over 180 companies have joined the “Accord.” Members commit to 
having their suppliers in Bangladesh undergo independent safety inspections and they agree to 
rectify any identified safety issues. A second, smaller (26 members), self-regulatory institution, 
the “Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety,” was also created to help buyers audit their 
suppliers and improve conditions. In addition to joining these programs, firms also took action 
on their own to improve their operations. For example, H&M, which had a strong program at the 
time of the collapse, improved their conditions further by committing to only sourcing from 
suppliers for which they are the sole client. This was a costly decision in terms of lost flexibility, 
but it has allowed them to monitor conditions more closely (Gustafsson, 2013). 
While the collapse was followed by substantial pressure from activists and the public for 
firms to self-regulate, it was not however, followed by any threat of future regulation from public 
officials. Only the German government has discussed the possibility of regulating supply chain 
conditions of apparel retailers and that discussion did not begin until April, 2014 – a full year 
after the collapse (Deutsche Welle, 2014). As of December, 2014 no official regulation has been 
confirmed. If the catastrophe had been likely to lead to regulation, then substantial CSR 
initiatives regarding supply chain working conditions might have preserved firm-value. In this 
case, firms with substantial initiatives will need to make fewer investments to meet the 
regulation requirements (Kim and Lyon, 2011; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005). Because the 
collapse only resulted in an increased threat of activist pressure, and not regulation, it allows me 
to empirically identify the impact that an increase in social movement pressure has on firm-
value.  
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The primary goal of this paper is to understand the impact of ex ante supply chain policies and 
activist pressure on the intra-industry market reactions to the collapse of Rana Plaza. As such, I 
match data from Sustainalytics on supply chain policies to financial market data on companies in 
the apparel industry. Sustainalytics produces and sells corporate environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) profiles to socially responsible investors. Sustainalytics covers the 4,092 
publicly owned companies included on the MSCI world market index. Because I am interested in 
the markets’ response to the apparel industry, I only include the 152 companies with SIC primary 
four-digit classifications related to the apparel industry.3 After matching companies in these 
industry classifications to data from CompuStat and the World Economic Forum the final sample 
is comprised of 111 companies in 23 countries. The Sustainalytics dataset has been used by a 
number of researchers in the management and CSR literatures (e.g., Garcia-Castro and 
Francoeur, 2014; Surroca, Tribo, and Zahra, 2013; Wolf, 2013).  
Table 1 reports the country distribution of the estimation sample.   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                     
3 These include: apparel and accessory stores; apparel and other finished products made from fabrics; apparel, piece 
goods, and notions – wholesale; department stores; family clothing stores; footwear, except rubber; men’s and boys’ 
furnishings, work clothing, and allied garments; grocery stores*; knitting mills; leather and leather products*; 
miscellaneous fabricated textile products; miscellaneous general merchandise stores; rubber and plastics footwear; 
shoe stores; textile mill products; variety stores*; women’s clothing stores; women’s and misses’, and juniors’ 
outerwear; and women’s, misses’, children’s, and infants’ undergarments.  
*Firms with the following industry classifications: grocery stores, leather and leather products, and variety stores 
were checked to confirm that the firm either manufactured or sold products made with textiles. This information was 
obtained from the detailed firm descriptions in the Sustainalytics’ Environmental, Social, and Governance reports. 
This resulted in the exclusion of 20 grocery stores, 1 variety store, and 1 leather and leather products firm. For 
example, Target is classified as a variety store, but it sells clothing under its own brand names. Thus, it is included.  
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Empirical specification 
To understand the determinants of intra-industry abnormal returns after the collapse of Rana 
Plaza I estimate an event study as summarized in MacKinlay (1997). These are commonly used 
to understand the financial implications of corporate events (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) 
and social and environmental disasters (e.g., Blacconiere and Patten, 1994). The stock market 
reaction is captured by the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the defined “event 
window.” Cumulative abnormal returns measure the extent to which a stock return deviates from 
its expected return after the event. To calculate the CARs, first, market risk-adjusted expected 
returns are estimated for each of the 111 firms in the sample with the following specification:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
where t=-120, …, -1 days, which defines the estimation period, and Rit is the return on stock i at 
time t. Data on daily stock prices are gathered from CompuStat’s North American and Global 
Security Daily datasets. According to both Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Park 
(2004), multi-country event studies should use each country’s respective market index return. As 
such, Rmct represents the 23 MSCI country-specific (c) indices (one for each country in my 
sample) at time t. The MSCI country-specific indices track large- and mid-cap equities that are 
listed on that country’s stock exchanges.  
Second, estimates of the daily abnormal return (AR) of firm i on day t are calculated:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼?̂? + 𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑐𝑡) 
 Finally, the CARs are determined by summing up the daily abnormal returns for each day 
in the “event window.” Similar to Blacconiere and Patten’s (1994) study of the Union Carbide 
environmental disaster, the collapse of Rana Plaza could not be anticipated, thus, the six-day 
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CAR begins the day of the event [0, +5].4 A six-day event window is chosen because a relatively 
short window helps to ensure that the abnormal returns are being explained by the collapse of 
Rana Plaza and not unrelated events. However, new information continued to be released several 
days following the collapse, thus an event window of only one or two days would not likely 
capture the full effect of the collapse. For example, the article on the collapse in the New York 
Times the day of the collapse reported only 142 deaths,5 but the article posted three days later on 
April 27th reported 348 deaths and many still missing.6 Figure 1 shows the number of newspaper 
articles published on the collapse for one month after the event.7  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The figure suggests that the collapse was highly prevalent in the media for the five business days 
following the collapse (until May, 1st), which is why I chose this window. The spike in media on 
May 9th was due to an unrelated fire that occurred at a textile factory in Bangladesh that renewed 
interest in the collapse, but no new information about the collapse was released.  
To examine the impact of supply chain programs on stock markets to the collapse of 
Rana Plaza I estimated the following regression as my main model:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(0, +5) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
+ 𝛽3 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿Γ𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖 
                                                     
4 The collapse occurred at 10pm EST, which was before North American and European stock markets opened 
leaving plenty of time for investors worldwide to respond on the day of the collapse (day 0).  
5 The first New York Times article reporting on the collapse can be found here: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Last 
accessed October, 2014.  
6 The New York Times article reporting 348 deaths can be found here: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/world/asia/rescues-and-arrests-in-building-collapse-in-bangladesh.html. Last 
accessed October, 2014.  
7 These numbers were gathered from LexisNexis by searching “’Rana Plaza’ AND Bangladesh” for all newspapers 
with duplicates not included. Weekends are excluded from the figure because the event-window can only include 
trading days.  
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where i indexes firms and c indexes countries. The key explanatory variables are substantive 
initiative (to test Hypothesis 1) and social activist pressure (to test Hypothesis 3). The second 
model also includes visibility to end-customers as a moderator interacted with both substantive 
initiative and symbolic initiative (to test Hypothesis 2). 𝑋𝑖 represents firm-level control variables 
and Γ𝑐 represents a country-level control variable. 𝜀𝑖  represents the error term, which captures the 
unobservable factors that may impact the six-day CARs. If these unobservable factors were 
correlated with a firm’s decision to adopt a substantive CSR initiative or past activist pressure, 
then my results could be subject to endogeneity concerns. However, to bias my results, the 
factors captured in the errors must be unobservable to the researcher, correlated with the 
variables of interest, and also observable to investors within the six-day event window.8 Because 
the Sustainalytics data is sold to investors, it is likely that the data used in these models is the 
same (or very similar) to the information available to the financial markets. The error term is 
robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country-level for more conservative estimates.  
Independent variables 
Substantive vs. symbolic supply chain initiatives. Sustainalytics identifies whether the firm has 
supply chain standards and an auditing program by searching the company website, 
sustainability reports, annual reports, PR news releases for relevant information, and through 
company feedback. To capture whether a firm has a substantive initiative, I created a binary 
variable that is coded as a “1” if the firm has released information indicating that they audit their 
suppliers regularly and “0” otherwise. Substantive initiatives are defined as regular auditing 
                                                     
8 For example, adopters of substantive initiatives may also have worse crisis management departments. Thus, it 
could be the quality of the crisis management department that is driving the negative relationship between the 
substantive initiative dummy and the six-day CAR. However, for that concern to hold, investors must be capable of 
assessing the quality of the crisis department within six days of the event. 
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programs, because supply chain management scholars have noted the importance of conducting 
regular audits as opposed to unique, or “one-off,” audits to ensure compliance is being 
continually met (e.g., Wieland and Handfield, 2013).  
To capture whether a firm has only a symbolic initiative, I created a binary variable that is 
coded as a “1” if the firm has a set of written standards regarding suppliers’ working conditions, 
but does not regularly audit their suppliers to ensure compliance is being met. Social standards 
for supply chains can include standards for health and safety conditions, minimum living wages, 
maximum working hours, child labor, discrimination, etc. Symbolic initiative is coded as a “0” 
for firms that do not have a set of supply chain standards or if it has a program to regularly audit 
their suppliers. Finally, I created no initiative, which is coded as “1” if the firm lacks either a 
symbolic or substantive initiative. It is coded “0” if the firm has either type of initiative. To avoid 
perfect multicollinearity, the dummy variable no initiative is not included in the regressions. 
Because this data is based off of publicly available information that is aggregated and sold to 
investors, I am assuming investors can distinguish between firms with symbolic and substantive 
supply chain programs. However, this does not imply that other stakeholders (e.g., customers) 
will be able (or will bother) to distinguish between the two types.  
Visibility to end-customers. To test my second hypothesis, that the decline in a firm’s 
stock return will be less severe for companies with supply chain programs when they are able to 
distinguish themselves from the industry, I include visibility to end-customers as a main effect in 
Model 1 and a moderator in Model 2. Apparel firms that are more visible to their end-customers 
will be better able to advertise their superior supply chain performance to their customers and 
therefore distinguish themselves. Researchers commonly assume that advertising expenditures 
proxy for visibility to customers (Arora and Cason, 1995; Beatty and Shimshack, 2010; Khanna 
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and Damon, 1999; Lyon and Shimshack, 2012). Unfortunately, advertising expenditures are not 
reported separately for companies in Compustat’s global database. As such, I use Selling, 
General, and Administrative (SG&A) costs, which includes advertising expenditures, per dollar 
of sales gathered from the CompuStat dataset.9 I take the natural log to adjust for skew.  
Activist attacks on supply chain social issues. To test my third hypothesis, that the decline 
in a firm’s stock return will be more severe for companies that were subject to stronger past 
pressure from activists on supply chain social issues, I include social activist pressure. Social 
activist pressure is measured as the number of times the firm has been targeted by activist groups 
or NGOs regarding social issues, such as unsafe working conditions or unpaid overtime, in their 
supply chains. Contentious actions such as boycotts, protest demonstrations, negative ads 
released by activists, and NGO sponsored reports (such as “Fatal Fashion”) that released 
negative information specifically on the focal firm’s suppliers’ operations, are included.  
This information is gathered from the Sustainalytics company reports, specifically from 
the text describing controversies the company was involved in regarding supply chain social 
issues. Sustainalytics gathers information on controversies in the areas of the environment, social 
issues, and governance from major news sources, such as Bloomberg, LexisNexis and others, 
and they distinguish between controversies related to the firms’ direct operations and those 
related to their supply chain. Controversies captured in these metrics are not simply those that 
occurred in the previous year, but rather controversies that are still relevant to stakeholders. For 
example, the International Labor Rights Forum released a report in 2010 that Nike’s 
                                                     
9 SG&A costs, however, also include employee costs such as pensions and salaries. To confirm that my results are 
not driven by this portion of SG&A costs, and rather are driven by the advertising expenditures, I run a robustness 
test in which I use an organization’s number of employees gathered from CompuStat. The interaction between 
substantive initiative and employees is not significant, but the interaction between substantive initiative and SG&A 
expenditures does remain significant even when controlling for employees.  
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manufacturing of soccer balls still relied upon child labor. Because the use of child labor is still a 
concern to Nike stakeholders, Sustainalytics continues to include this as a relevant controversy in 
the company report. This metric is coded to exclude union disputes and strikes unless an activist 
group was specifically mentioned as being involved in disseminating information about the 
dispute, or was known to organize it. 
Two researchers content coded the social supply chain controversies from the company 
reports. In the first round of content coding each researcher individually captured the number of 
attacks and campaigns against the firm. Then, discrepancies were identified, and after some 
discussion, each reviewer recoded any discrepancies. After the second round, an interrater 
reliability score of 94 percent was achieved. The remaining discrepancies were discussed and 
100 percent consensus was reached.  
Control variables 
All other activist pressure. As posited earlier, scrutiny from activists will increase to 
some extent for all firms within the industry after a catastrophe. As such, experience and 
knowledge of how to strategically handle activists’ demands and campaigns will be valuable 
after a catastrophe (McDonnell and King, 2013). To control for experience separately from the 
likelihood that the company will be targeted more frequently (as captured by social activist 
pressure above), I include all other activist pressure. This measure is constructed similarly to 
social activist pressure, only it includes attacks regarding environmental issues, governance and 
corruption issues, and social issues not related to a firms’ suppliers (i.e., issues regarding a firm’s 
direct employees, the community, and customers). After the second round of coding, an 
interrater reliability score of 97 percent was achieved and the remaining discrepancies were 
discussed and 100 percent consensus was reached. The risk of these types of attacks is unlikely 
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to increase after the collapse because these issues were not evoked. Thus, it controls for the 
company’s experience with activists.  
Supply chain reputation. To capture a firm’s overall past reputation as it relates to social 
issues in the supply chain, I use Sustainalytics’ measure of the magnitude of the firm’s supply 
chain social controversies. This is important to include because it may be correlated with a firm’s 
decision to implement either a symbolic or substantive initiative and it may also influence the 
financial market’s response to the collapse. This includes events excluded from the social activist 
pressure measure above, such as labor disputes at suppliers, fines from local regulators, or cases 
in which a supplier was found breaking local laws. When constructing this measure 
Sustainalytics analysts assess the magnitude of each incident related to a firm’s supply chain 
labor practices. To do this, the analyst considers the following six characteristics of each event 
from the perspective of multiple stakeholders: the impact of the incident, its degree of 
exceptionality, its sphere of influence, its level of reoccurrence, the firm’s response, and whether 
the firm has any management systems in place to help respond to the event.  
This measure is given a “100” point score by Sustainalytics if the firm has not had any 
meaningful controversies. The company receives “80” points if the firm has had one or two 
minor controversies that might raise minimal concerns to stakeholders, either because the event 
is common to the industry or because the company responded effectively. The score will be “50” 
points if the company has either had one or two significant controversies or several minor 
controversies. Significant controversies have a high impact on stakeholders, such as a breach in 
local or international laws on repeated occasions. “20” points will be allocated to companies with 
one severe or several significant controversies. Finally, the score will be “0” if there is evidence 
of complicity in the most serious crimes. In this sample, no firms are assigned a “0” as this is 
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reserved for firms that are directly responsible for the most catastrophic events. To ease 
interpretation, I reverse code this variable to be 0–3, such that a “0” reflects firms with no 
controversies and a “3” reflects firms with one severe or several significant controversies. The 
controversies magnitude metric from Sustainalytics has also been used in Surroca, Tribo, and 
Zahra (2013).10  
Size. Annual company sales is a common way to capture a company’s generic visibility 
to its stakeholders (e.g., Marquis and Toffel, 2014; Patten 2002). I measure sales in thousands of 
U.S. dollars based on data from Worldscope.  
Financial development. Some researchers have noted that when using a multi-country 
event study it is important to consider each country’s financial market’s state of development and 
maturity (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti, 2010; Park, 2004). As such, I include financial 
development, which is an index measuring the trustworthiness and efficiency of 62 financial 
markets gathered from the World Economic Forum.  
Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Table 2.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
RESULTS 
Results are reported in Table 3. All independent variables, moderators, and control variables are 
lagged by one year. Focusing first on the control variables from the main effects model (Model 
1), I find that firms with worse supply chain reputations (or, those with more controversies) are 
impacted significantly less negatively (β = 0.030; p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with my 
                                                     
10 Because social activist pressure, social supply chain controversies, and all other activist pressure are positively 
correlated (all with correlations greater than 0.5) I run a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis after my main model 
to check for multicollinearity problems. The greatest VIF value is 3.41, which is well below the generally accepted 
rule of thumb limit of 10.  
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arguments that firms with a better CSR reputation will be harmed more severely after a 
catastrophe. However, the controversies metric does not necessarily capture a firm’s willingness 
to make future improvements, because the controversies metric reflects past problems and not 
the firm’s current commitment toward supply chain social issues.  
The significant positive coefficient on all other activist pressure (β = 0.005; p < 0.05) 
suggests that experience dealing with activism does help firms preserve value after the collapse. 
The significant negative coefficient on sales (β = -0.004; p < 0.01) suggests that stock returns for 
larger firms were impacted more negatively by the collapse. The main effect of end-customer 
visibility is also negative and significant (β = -0.011; p < 0.05). Firms headquartered in countries 
that are more financially developed were impacted more negatively (β = -0.017; p < 0.05).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Turning to the first hypothesis, that firms with substantive supply chain programs will be 
impacted more negatively after the collapse, I find a significant negative coefficient on the 
substantive program dummy variable (β = -0.020; p < 0.05). This coefficient indicates that 
having a program to regularly audit suppliers was associated with a 2.0 percent larger decrease in 
the firm’s CAR as compared to firms that had no CSR initiative. This lends support to 
Hypothesis 1. The coefficient on symbolic initiative is negative, but not significant. Because 
firms with symbolic programs have failed to make substantial investments in improving their 
supply chain standards in the past (despite their public commitment to do so), it is not surprising 
that the financial markets did not take this as a signal that the firm would self-regulate.  
The significant positive coefficient on the interaction between the substantive initiative 
dummy variable and visibility to end-customers in Model 2 (β = 0.022; p < 0.05) indicates that 
firms with substantive programs do realize a smaller decline in stock value when they are more 
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visible to their end-customers, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the coefficient 
on the interaction between the symbolic program dummy variable and visibility to end-customers 
is actually negative (but not significant), which is the opposite of what was predicted. This lends 
mixed support for Hypothesis 2, that CSR initiatives, regardless of quality, can help preserve 
firm-value for firms that are more visible to their end-customers. These results suggest that only 
firms with substantive CSR initiatives can distinguish themselves from the industry as being 
superior performers.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The interaction plot (Figure 2) shows that amongst firms with substantive initiatives (as 
represented by the line with square markers), the relationship between the CARs and end-
customer visibility is actually positive. The significant coefficient on the interaction indicates 
that this relationship is significantly more positive than the seemingly negative relationship 
between the CARs and end-customer visibility amongst firms with no CSR initiative (as 
represented by the solid line with circular markers).  
The significant negative coefficient on social activist pressure in Model 2 (β = -0.004; p 
< 0.05) lends support to Hypothesis 3, that firms subject to greater past activist pressure 
regarding supply chain social issues will realize a larger negative response after the collapse.  
Robustness tests 
Alternative stories. There may be some concern that the selection of my sample includes firms 
that were not impacted by the collapse of Rana Plaza. It is possible that some firms captured in 
the GICS codes relevant to the apparel industry include firms that, for example, primarily 
manufacture in developed countries. Such firms would be less likely to be associated with the 
supply chain problems and would also be less likely to have substantive supply chain initiatives. 
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Thus, the negative coefficient on the substantive initiative dummy could be driven by the 
comparison of firms that were impacted by the collapse to those that were not related.  
To address this potential issue, I run a robustness test in which I use oversight of ESG 
(environmental, social, and governance) issues instead of the substantive and symbolic initiative 
dummies. Oversight of ESG captures whether there is explicit responsibility for environmental, 
social, or governance issues at the board level. Assigning senior level responsibilities for ESG 
issues is critical to ensuring that CSR initiatives are actually implemented (Morgan, Ryu, and 
Mirvis, 2009), thus this metric can serve as a proxy for the likelihood that a firm will self-
regulate following a catastrophe. This measure is also unlikely to be correlated with whether the 
firm was associated with the collapse, because oversight of ESG issues could include 
environmental concerns or concerns of the wellbeing of direct employees. Unfortunately, due to 
limited information on board level CSR activities, Sustainalytics only gathers this metric for 
large cap companies. Therefore, it is only available for 56 companies in my sample. Despite the 
limited sample, the coefficient on oversight of ESG is negative and significant (β = -0.014; p < 
0.01), lending further support for Hypothesis 1. Table 4 presents the results of this robustness test 
for the variables of theoretical interest.  
Political Pressure. Earlier I asserted that the collapse was characterized purely by the 
increased threat of activism and public discontent and not by the increased threat of regulation. 
To confirm that this is the case, I run a robustness test including political risk, a country-level 
metric capturing the likelihood that new regulation can be passed. This metric captures the 
“extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in 
government policy” as measured by Henisz (2002: pg. 363) and has been used by many others 
(e.g., Jensen, 2008; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010). The main effect of political risk is slightly 
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negative (β=-0.002), but insignificant, denoting no significant relationship between a country’s 
overall risk of enacting regulatory changes and the financial markets’ response to the collapse. If 
increased regulatory pressure was a concern after the collapse theory would suggest that the 
interaction between substantive initiative and political risk would be positive and significant. 
The coefficient is positive (β=0.007), but not significant. These results suggest that the risk of 
political pressure was not a significant consideration after the collapse (see Table 4 for results). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Alternative windows. In robustness tests I also consider five-day (0, +4) and seven-day 
(0, +6) windows. Reassuringly, my results yield similar results (see Table 5).  
Confounding events. Another concern is the potential presence of confounding events. It 
is possible the existence of an event unrelated to the collapse is driving my results if: 1) the 
extraneous event occurred during the six-day “event window” following the collapse, and 2) the 
event impacted firms differentially based on the variables of interest after controlling for firm-
level and country-level characteristics. To ensure that my results are not being driven by firms 
with unusually high or low abnormal returns potentially caused by confounding events, I simply 
omit firms in the top ten percent and bottom ten percent of CARs.11 Reassuringly, my results 
yield similar results (see Table 5).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                     
11 Event-studies sometimes search for firm-level confounding events rather than drop the extremes. However, while 
there are many benefits to using a global sample, one downside is that the availability of information on firm-level 
financial announcements varies considerably from country to country. Attempting to account for firm-level 
confounding events might introduce new biases to my sample because of this variation in the availability of data. 
For example, it is likely that I would find more evidence of confounding events for firms headquartered in the 
United States than for firms headquartered in India. The issue of only partially accounting for confounding events 
has been noted for even single country event studies (Armitage, 1995), however adding additional countries to the 
study exacerbates the problem. Thus, dropping the extremes allows me to account for this without having to 
introduce new biases to my data.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I presented theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that financial markets 
react more severely to firms with substantive CSR initiatives than firms without initiatives after a 
catastrophe. I posited that firms with substantive CSR initiatives are expected to make future 
investments needed to repair the industry’s aggregate reputation to mitigate harsh penalties from 
activists, customers, and eventually even regulators. I find that the negative effect of having 
substantive CSR is lessened when firms can distinguish themselves from the industry. I also find 
that the negative response is larger as firms are subject to greater past pressure from activists.  
Contributions 
My findings contribute to work on the reputation commons problem, the value of CSR, and 
social movements. This study suggests there may be a limit to the value preserving nature of 
CSR. As discussed earlier, a reputation for behaving responsibly may act as reputational risk-
management, or “insurance” after adverse events (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 
2009; Minor and Morgan, 2011). However, my results suggest that CSR initiatives may actually 
destroy firm-value after a catastrophe by signaling to investors that the firm will further self-
regulate to remain in line with stakeholders’ updated expectations for social responsibility.  
Others have argued that one way to solve the reputation commons problem is for a subset 
of firms to self-regulate (e.g., Barnett and King, 2008). I posited that investors react more 
severely to firms with substantive CSR, because they anticipate that firms with substantive CSR 
will strategically decide to invest in costly self-regulation to mitigate the problem. Whereas firms 
without CSR initiatives will still benefit from those investments, without having to make any of 
their own – a free-riding problem. King, Lenox, and Barnett (2002) posit that a different way to 
mitigate the problem is for firms to distinguish themselves as “good” performers. My finding 
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that the negative effect of having substantive CSR is lessened when firms are more visible to 
end-customers lends empirical support to this theory.  
Despite concerns that consumers cannot distinguish between substantive and symbolic 
CSR initiatives (e.g., King, Prado, and Rivera, 2012), I find that the benefits of having CSR only 
increase with visibility to end-customers for firms with substantive initiatives. This supports 
Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) argument that “CSR engagement must be substantial 
enough to create a credible and reasonable declaration of unselfish intention” (pg. 428) for CSR 
to provide a credible signal of the firm’s benevolent intent to external stakeholders. This result 
suggests that investors believe that customers can distinguish between symbolic and substantive 
CSR initiatives, and only value the substantive ones.  
Finally, my findings contribute to the social movement literature. This literature argues 
that activists are highly strategic when deciding which firms to target (e.g., Soule, 2009). 
However, the reputation commons research has previously argued that sanctions levied on firms 
within the industry are equal and that activists may boycott the entire industry or target firms 
arbitrarily (Barnett and King, 2008: pg. 1152). While a catastrophe does increase scrutiny upon 
the entire industry, some firms will realize larger sanctions from activists due to their strategic 
targeting. In this study, I find that firms subject to greater activist pressure do realize larger 
losses. This result suggests that investors anticipate that activists will impose additional sanctions 
to certain firms that are easy targets.  
For managers, my findings reveal that investors might interpret substantive CSR 
initiatives as a willingness to go above and beyond after a catastrophe. There are many benefits 
to engaging in CSR, including the ability to attract more productive employees (Burbano, 2014) 
and the ability to exploit new markets for environmentally friendly products (Arora and 
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Gangopadhyay, 1995). Additionally, CSR can preserve firm-value after an adverse event. 
However, this study highlights one situation in which it might be costly.  
Limitations and future research  
These findings do have limitations. I assume that investors interpret a firm’s past commitment to 
implementing CSR initiatives as an indication that they will make future improvements. This 
methodology does not allow me to test whether these firms actually did make costly 
improvements to their supply chain standards after the collapse. Thus, it is possible that investors 
used substantive CSR initiatives as a signal of something other than a willingness to make future 
investments.  
It is possible that rather than signaling future self-regulation, firms with substantive CSR 
may have lost more firm-value after the collapse because new information was revealed 
regarding the difficulties of managing supply chain conditions. For example, despite having a 
strong supply chain monitoring system, Wal-Mart’s clothing was still found at Rana Plaza. The 
company’s suppliers had subcontracted (in defiance of their contract) to a manufacturer in the 
building. If investors had previously valued substantive CSR initiatives (i.e., supply chain 
auditing systems) and the collapse revealed new information that caused them to devalue those 
programs, this could be an alternative explanation. However, it has long been understood that 
managing supply chain conditions is difficult and complicated. Just six months prior to the 
collapse a textile factory, which had recently been certified as having fire safety precautions in 
place (according to SA8000), caught on fire and killed over 300 employees (Walsh and 
Greenhouse, 2012). This event, and several others, revealed the imperfect nature of auditing 
textile suppliers. The collapse simply emphasized that supply chain monitoring systems are 
imperfect and are therefore in need of improvement.  
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Finally, the results of this study are limited to one catastrophe, which raises 
generalizability concerns. My research question hinges on studying catastrophes, which 
fortunately for society, do not occur frequently. Given the relatively new availability of data on 
the quality of CSR initiatives it is difficult to test whether similar reactions have occurred in 
response to other catastrophes in the past. Because the collapse featured only increased pressure 
from activists, and not increased pressure from public regulations, I would not expect a clear 
relationship between having a substantive CSR initiative and firm-value after a catastrophe that 
features both. The threat of future public regulation might preserve firm-value for firms with 
CSR (Kim and Lyon, 2011; Schnietz and Epstein, 2005), whereas the expectation for self-
regulation can destroy firm-value for firms with CSR.  
Despite these limitations, this paper makes a significant contribution to the literatures on 
the reputation commons problem, the value of CSR, and social movements. After a catastrophe, 
some firms may need to make costly changes to repair the aggregate industry reputation. This 
study emphasizes the need for future research to consider which firms will be expected to make 
those improvements when analyzing the value of CSR.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Country of headquarters 
Country Firms Percent   Country Firms Percent   Country Firms Percent 
Australia 7 6.3   Germany 6 5.4   Spain 1 0.9 
Brazil 5 4.5   Hong Kong 4 3.6   Sweden 1 0.9 
Canada 3 2.7   Japan 11 9.9   Taiwan 4 3.6 
Chile 1 0.9   Malaysia 1 0.9   Thailand 1 0.9 
China 8 7.2   Mexico 2 1.8   Turkey 1 0.9 
Colombia 1 0.9   Russia 1 0.9   United Kingdom 7 6.3 
Finland 1 0.9   South Africa 6 5.4   United States 30 27.0 
France 5 4.5   South Korea 4 3.6   Total 111   
 
  Table 2. Summary statistics and correlations 
          Correlations 
  Variable Mean S.D.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 6-day CAR 0.0 0.04   1.00                   
2 Controversies 0.3 0.55   0.18 1.00                 
3 All other activist pressure 0.9 1.65   0.13 0.55 1.00               
4 Ln sales 8.6 1.40   -0.08 0.45 0.38 1.00             
5 Financial development 4.9 0.49   -0.12 0.04 0.02 -0.04 1.00           
6 Dummy for no CSR initiative 0.4 0.48   0.00 -0.34 -0.34 -0.28 -0.17 1.00         
7 Dummy for a symbolic initiative 0.3 0.47   0.05 -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 0.10 -0.52 1.00       
8 Dummy for a substantive initiative 0.3 0.47   -0.05 0.47 0.49 0.42 0.07 -0.50 -0.48 1.00     
9 Social activist pressure 1.3 2.89   0.04 0.77 0.69 0.47 0.05 -0.32 -0.19 0.52 1.00   
10 Ln advertising expenditures 0.0 1.00   -0.14 -0.23 -0.24 -0.19 -0.39 0.45 -0.11 -0.35 -0.25 1.00 
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Table 3. Event study regression results 
 
Dependent variable: 6-day cumulative abnormal return 
 
Predictors (1) (2) 
  
Main  
effects 
Moderated 
effects 
Control Variables     
Controversies 0.030** 0.031** 
  [0.010] [0.009] 
All other activist pressure 0.005* 0.004+ 
  [0.002] [0.002] 
Ln sales -0.005 -0.005 
  [0.003] [0.004] 
Financial development -0.017* -0.019* 
  [0.007] [0.007] 
Theoretical variables     
H1: Substantive initiative -0.020* -0.012 
  [0.009] [0.008] 
Symbolic initiative -0.006 -0.008 
  [0.008] [0.008] 
H2: Social activist pressure -0.004* -0.004* 
  [0.002] [0.002] 
Customer visibility† -0.011* -0.014+ 
  [0.005] [0.007] 
Moderator terms     
H3: Symbolic initiative x customer visibility†   -0.004 
    [0.009] 
H3: Substantive initiative x customer visibility†   0.022* 
    [0.010] 
Observations 111 111 
R-squared 0.185 0.230 
Robust standard errors in brackets, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. † indicates variables 
that are standardized.  
 
 
  
36 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of newspaper articles on Rana Plaza collapse 
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Table 4. Robustness tests 
Predictors Oversight of ESG Political Pressure 
  
Main  
effects 
Main  
effects 
Moderated 
effects 
Theoretical variables       
H1: Substantive initiative   -0.017 -0.013 
    [0.012] [0.013] 
Symbolic initiative   -0.004 -0.003 
    [0.009] [0.010] 
H1 alt: Oversight of ESG† -0.014**     
  [0.004]     
H2: Social activist pressure -0.004* -0.004+ -0.004+ 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Customer visibility† -0.011** -0.013** -0.013** 
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] 
Political pressure†   -0.002 -0.004 
    [0.004] [0.006] 
Moderator terms       
H3: Symbolic initiative x political pressure†     0.007 
      [0.008] 
H3: Substantive initiative x political pressure†     -0.005 
      [0.013] 
Observations 56 103 103 
R-squared 0.342 0.220 0.230 
Standard errors clustered by country in brackets; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1;  
† indicates variables are standardized 
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Table 5. Robustness tests continued 
 
Predictors Alternative windows Confounding events 
  5-day CAR 7-day CAR   
  
Main  
effects 
Moderated 
effects 
Main  
effects 
Moderated 
effects 
Main 
effects 
Moderated 
effects 
Theoretical variables             
H1: Substantive initiative -0.019* -0.009 -0.021+ -0.013 -0.016* -0.013 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] 
Symbolic initiative -0.006 -0.009 -0.014 -0.016 -0.008 -0.010 
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] 
H2: Social activist pressure -0.004* -0.004* -0.003* -0.003+ -0.004** -0.004** 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Customer visibility† -0.012* -0.014+ -0.014** -0.016** -0.007* -0.010** 
  [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] 
Moderator terms             
H3: Symbolic initiative x customer visibility†   -0.006   -0.007   0.000 
    [0.010]   [0.009]   [0.006] 
H3: Substantive initiative x customer visibility†   0.024*   0.020*   0.012+ 
    [0.010]   [0.008]   [0.006] 
Observations 111 111 111 111 88 88 
R-squared 0.195 0.252 0.156 0.197 0.230 0.260 
Standard errors clustered by country in brackets; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1;  
† indicates variables are standardized    
 
